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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

CHARLES LEE DIVINEY,

Case No. 20020220-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

On appeal, Appellant Charles Diviney has raised two issues. The first issue
concerns a clerical error in the "Judgment, Sentence." Diviney entered a guilty plea to
"burglary," aggravated assault, and three misdemeanor offenses. Thereafter, the trial
court entered judgment against Diviney for "aggravated burglary," aggravated assault,
and three misdemeanor offenses. (See Brief of Appellant, dated August 7, 2003, at 815.) The judgment for "aggravated burglary" is incorrect. The state has acknowledged
that error, and has agreed that the judgment should be corrected. (See State's Brief of
Appellee ("State's Brief) at 11-12 (agreeing that the trial court incorrectly entered
judgment and sentence for "aggravated burglary" rather than "burglary").) This Court
may remand the case for that correction.
The second issue concerns restitution. Diviney has asked this Court to vacate part
of the restitution amount ordered by the trial court. Specifically, the court ordered
Diviney to reimburse Crime Victims' Reparations ("CVR") for amounts that CVR paid
to Deborah Diviney for lost wages and personal property. That order is in error in three

ways. First, the trial court incorrectly computed the restitution for lost wages. (Brief of
Appellant at 18.) The state acknowledges that error. (State's Brief at 14-17.) Thus, this
Court may vacate that restitution amount and remand the matter for a correct calculation.
Second, the trial court erroneously awarded restitution for amounts in lost wages
that Deborah would not have earned; and third, the restitution amount relating to
personal property is erroneously high. (Brief of Appellant at 15-27.) The state disagrees
with Diviney's analyses regarding those matters. (State's Brief at 17-25.) Thus, they are
further addressed here. See Utah R. App. P. 24(c) (2003); infra, pp. 2-17, herein.
The state also claims that Diviney did not preserve the restitution issue for appeal.
(State's Brief at 22.) That claim is inadequately briefed. In addition, the record fails to
support the state's claims, as further explained below. See infra, p. 10, n.3 & pp. 17-19.
ARGUMENT
THE LAW SUPPORTS DIVINEY'S POSITION THAT THE
RESTITUTION AWARD REIMBURSING CVR FOR "CHARGE OFF"
DAYS AND PERSONAL PROPERTY/SECURITY EXPENSES IS
IMPROPER.
A. SINCE DEBORAH TESTIFIED THAT SHE HAS NEVER WORKED AT
THE SCHOOL DISTRICT ON "CHARGE OFF" DAYS, THE AMOUNTS
RELATING TO THOSE PURPORTED LOST WAGES MAY NOT BE
INCLUDED IN THE RESTITUTION CALCULATION.
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, in this case, the trial court ordered Diviney
to reimburse CVR for amounts in lost wages paid to Deborah. (Brief of Appellant at 16.)
The trial court included amounts that - according to historical data - Deborah would not
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have earned even if she had not suffered an injury in connection with the crimes in this
case. (Brief of Appellant at 15-23.) That was improper. (Id.)
To reiterate, C VR officer Christine Ackmann testified at the restitution hearing
that CVR compensated Deborah for work days missed at the school district due to an
injury she suffered in the assault on June 14, 2000.{ (See R. 292:10-13; Brief of Appellant at 15-23.) The days missed totaled 41 and included June 30, 2000; July 31, 2000
(see notes 1 & 2); August 31, 2000; September 29, 2000; October 27, 2000; November
30, 2000; January 30, 2001; February 28, 2001; March 30, 2001; April 30, 2001;
May 31, 2001; June 29, 2001; and July 18, 2001 (see notes 1 & 2). (R. 292:10-13.)
The days listed above are not actual work days at the school for Deborah. That is,
with the exception of July 18, 2001, the above days were "charge off' days. (R. 292:4853 (Deborah acknowledged that she regularly took the last day of each month off work at
the school district to work at Discover Card); State's Brief at 17, n. 14 (acknowledging
that all but two of the above dates are "charge off days).)
Deborah testified that on "charge off' days, it was her regular practice to work

'At the time of the injury (June 14, 2000), Deborah worked two jobs. She worked
in a lunchroom for Granite School District (R. 292:55 (f,I work at a year-around school,
but we are off during the month of July")), and she worked as a senior account manager
at Discover Card. (R. 292:39.) Deborah received paid time off at Discover Card (R. 292:
36). Also, she could take leave from work without jeopardizing her job there. (R.
292:36, 53.) CVR did not compensate Deborah for days missed at Discover Card.
However, since Deborah did not receive paid time off at the school district, CVR
compensated her for days that she missed there due to her injury and to matters relating
to this case.
3

only at Discover Card. (R. 292:61-62, also 292:48-49.) For years prior to the injury in
this case, and since recovery, she never worked at the school district on "charge off
days. (See R. 292:61-62.) Even when Discover Card changed its policy six months
before the June-14 injury to allow for late payment postings on "charge off days,
Deborah continued to take that day off from work at the school district. In short, she
never worked at the school district on "charge off days. (R. 292:61-65; see. also R.
292:67-68 (after recovering from her injuries, Deborah continued with her routine and
regular practice of taking the last day of each month off work from the school district in
order to work at Discover Card).) For Deborah, "charge off days at the school district
were like weekends in that she did not work them, injury or not.
Thus, Deborah was not entitled to restitution for lost wages for "charge off days.
(Brief of Appellant at 15-23.) The evidence fails to support "actual" economic or work
loss for those days. (See id); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-20l(l)(c), (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001)
("special damages" are recoverable in restitution; "not general damages"); 77-3 8a-102(6)
(Supp. 2001) (same); 63-25a-41 l(4)(d) (Supp. 2003) (specifying that reparations may be
made to a victim of crime for "actual loss of past earnings"); State v. Corbitt 2003 UT
App 417, Tfll, 82 P.3d 211 (discussing "actual" losses in restitution). In this case, it was
error for the trial court to award restitution to CVR (as assignee to Deborah's claims) for
wages relating to "charge off days. (Brief of Appellant, at 17-23.)
The state disagrees with Diviney's analysis. According to the state, the fact that
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Deborah historically did not work on "charge off days is "of little relevance" in determining special damages. (State's Brief at 19.) The state claims Deborah had "little, if any,
opportunity" to establish a history prior to the injury here. (Id.) Yet, Deborah's historical, routine practice at all times prior to the injury and after recovery constitutes clear
evidence of "actual" work and "actual" wages for calculating restitution here.
Since Deborah never worked "charge off days at the school district, either before
the injury or after recovery (R. 292:62, 67-68), the amounts in purported wages for those
days do not constitute "actual" lost wages. They are not recoverable against Diviney as
restitution. (See Brief of Appellant, at 19-23 (citing, inter alia, Utah Code Ann. §§ 6325a-402(38) (Supp. 2003) (defining "work loss" for victims' reparations); 63-25a41 l(4)(d) (specifying that reparations may be made to a victim of crime for "actual loss
of past earnings" and anticipated future earnings).)2

2

With respect to Deborah's compensation for days off in July, the state seems to
claim that compensation was appropriate even though Deborah acknowledged that the
year-around school was closed that month. (See. State's Brief at 17, n.14.) According to
the state, Deborah is entitled to the compensation because "there is no record evidence
concerning how Granite employees were paid: whether they were paid only during the
times they worked, or whether their salaries were adjusted to permit for paychecks to be
issued during the entire year, regardless of when the school was closed." (Id.)
That argument is illogical. If paychecks were "adjusted to permit for paychecks to
be issued" (kL) each month of the year, that means the school was making the adjustment
because it was closed in July; teachers and staff did not work then, yet they received
"adjusted" paychecks based on their work for the remaining months of the year.
Whether Deborah received only one paycheck per year for all services performed,
or 24 checks equally disbursed over a 12-month period does not change the fact that she
did not work in July when the year-around school was closed. The evidence on that point
was presented specifically to the trial court. (R. 292:55.) Thereafter, the court ordered
5

The state also seems to claim that if Deborah had not been injured, she could have
worked both the school district shift on "charge off days, and at Discover Card "if she
choose [sic] to do so." (State's Brief at 18.) The state seems to argue that Deborah (or
CVR as the assignee) may recover damages for lost opportunity, i.e. "general damages,"
as part of restitution. (State's Brief at 17-20.) That argument is not supported by the
law. (See Brief of Appellant at 15-23 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(c), (4)(a)(i)
(allowing for "special damages" in restitution); First Sec. BanL N.A. v. Banberrv
Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989) (recognizing that "special damages" require
proof that the injured party's loss has been realized or liquidated); Utah Code Ann. §§
63-25a-402(38) (Supp. 2003), -41 l(4)(d) (specifying that reparations may be made to a
victim of crime for "actual loss of past earnings" and anticipated future earnings);
Washington v. American Community Stores Corp.. 244 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Neb. 1976)
(recognizing that loss of actual past earnings constitutes "special damages," while "loss
of earning capacity" is a "general" damage claim); Delphen v. Dep't of Transp. & Dev..
657 So. 2d 328, 336 (La. App.) (recognizing that loss of "earning capacity" is not
determined by "actual loss"; also, it is not "pecuniary loss"), cert, denied, 663 So.2d 717

restitution for all work loss days requested by the state. (R. 293:6-7; 292:24 (state and
Ackmann identified only 5 ineligible work-loss days in May 2000, predating the crimes);
Case No. 001912025 ("Case 2025") at 185-86; Case 2025 at 192 (court ordered
restitution based on the state's requests).) The trial court's order included work loss for
days in July 2000 and 2001. Since Deborah did not work at all in July, the amount for
lost wages contains a miscalculation. This Court may correct the matter here or remand it
for proper calculation of the amounts. See also infra, p. 10 n. 3.
6

(La. 1995)).)
Utah law does not allow recovery for lost opportunity in restitution. The
legislature intended limits on amounts recoverable, particularly for lost wages. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-3-20 l(l)(c), (4)(a)(i) (stating that pecuniary damages are recoverable in
restitution, and defining pecuniary damages as "special damages," "not general
damages"); 63-25a-41 l(4)(d) (specifying that reparations may be made to a victim of
crime for "actual loss of past earnings"). Thus, as stated above, the victim's "actual"
work history becomes relevant in determining "actual" loss of past earnings.
Consider the following example: suppose every winter for a number of years prior
to the wrist injury, a local ski resort asked Deborah to operate ski lifts on weekends for a
specific amount in wages. Although Deborah's schedule with the school and Discover
Card would accommodate the weekend seasonal job, each year she turned down the extra
wages and chose not to do the work. Suppose the resort approached Deborah with the
same opportunity while her wrist was injured and for the year after recovery. Again
Deborah declined the extra wages and work. She claimed that during the injury period, it
would have been impossible: Loading lifts would cause pain and swelling to her wrist.
Deborah also claimed that during the injury period, she was denied the opportunity and
the choice to earn the extra wages. After recovery, Deborah could have done the extra
work, but she chose not to.
Under the hypothetical, Deborah would not be entitled to restitution for the extra
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wages she did not earn during the injury period. Those wages would not qualify as
actual loss of past earnings. See New York State Depart, of Audit and Control v. Crime
Compensation Board, 431 N.Y.S.2d 598, 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (determining that
crime victim had no actual loss of earnings where he was unemployed for 8 months prior
to the crime); Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-41 l(4)(d) (reparations may be made to a victim
of crime for "actual loss of past earnings"). They would qualify only as lost opportunity
or general damages. Washington, 244 N.W.2d at 289 ("loss of earning capacity" is a
"general" damage claim); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-20l(l)(c), (4)(a)(i) ("general
damages" are not recoverable in restitution). Even though a specific amount in wages
may be identified for ski-lift operators, in the hypothetical, Deborah historically never
worked the seasonal job or earned the extra wages.
As in the hypothetical, in the hearing in this case, Deborah's work history identified amounts compensable for "actual" work loss. That history does not support that
Deborah may recover lost wages for "charge off days and days in July that she routinely
and normally did not work at the school district. Those amounts may not be included in
the restitution order.
Finally, the state does not dispute that the law requires a person seeking reparations to mitigate damages. (See State's Brief at 20-21); see also Utah Code Ann. § 6325a-402(38) (stating that recoverable income will be reduced by amount in wages for
reasonable employment that victim failed to undertake). Nevertheless, the state
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maintains that here, "Deborah met the mitigation requirement by getting out and working
despite her injuries." (State's Brief at 21.) The state's argument misses the point.
In this case, Deborah testified that she was required to use her injured wrist to perform tasks for both jobs at Discover Card and the school district. Deborah also testified
that every day but "charge off day, she could work both jobs. (See 292:60.) On "charge
off days, the work at Discover Card was particularly intense and "stressful." (Compare
R. 292:59 (stating that the work at Discover Card on "charge off days was constant,
precise and stressful on her wrist); with R. 292:60 (stating that she continuously used her
wrist for work at the school district).) Yet, she worked at Discover Card on those days.
Deborah could take paid leave from work on "charge off days at Discover Card.
(R. 292:36, 53.) She could not take paid leave from her job with the school district.
Nevertheless, Deborah chose to work at Discover Card on "charge off days and then
requested compensation from CVR for wages from the school district even though she
normally would not have worked at the school on those days. That is not mitigation.
In this case, the trial court disregarded the law when it allowed restitution for
amounts CVR paid to Deborah in connection with "charge off days. That constitutes an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Utah 1989) Oudge's
discretion in sentencing lies within the limits prescribed by law); State v. Jolivet, 712
P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986) (discretion in sentencing is limited by the law); State v.
Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1219-20 (Utah 1984) (statutory law prescribes the bounds of
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the trial court's discretion).
The court abused its discretion in two respects: First, Deborah was not entitled to
"lost wages" for "charge off days and days worked in July, since those wages do not
constitute actual or special damages. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(c), (4)(a)(i)
(limiting restitution to pecuniary or "special damages"). Second, and alternatively,
Deborah was not entitled to lost wages where she failed to properly mitigate. Either
argument may serve as a basis for vacating the trial court's ruling as it relates to
compensation for "charge off days and days worked in July.3
B. THE AMOUNT IN RESTITUTION FOR PERSONAL PROPERTY/
SECURITY IS IMPROPER AND BASED ON A MISCALCULATION.
1. Divinev's Opening Brief Correctly Calculates the Amount in Restitution for
"Personal Property" Expenses Relating to Security.

3

The state asserts that Diviney "did not preserve his challenges to the amounts
ordered for lost wages generally". (State's Brief at 4.) That statement is incorrect. (See
R. 293:6 (defense counsel objected to restitution amounts in prosecutor's brief).) It also
is in conflict with other claims in the State's Brief, where the state asserts that defendant
preserved the argument relating to "'charge off days." (See State's Brief at 17.)
According to the record, Diviney preserved the issues below. Specifically, the
record here shows that defendant objected to restitution and requested a hearing at
sentencing (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (requiring defendant to request a
restitution hearing at sentencing); R. 408:12-13 (at sentencing Diviney objected to
restitution and requested a hearing)); and he participated in several proceedings on
restitution in the trial court. (R. 410, 292, 293.) Also, the trial court ruled specifically on
each restitution amount and issue. (Case 2025 at 191-92.) Diviney has properly
preserved the issues relating to lost wages. This Court may decide the issues on the
merits. Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'a 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App.) ("A matter
is sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an
opportunity to rule on the issue"), cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997).
10

Next, Diviney has challenged the trial court's order that he reimburse CVR in the
amount of $916 for Deborah's personal property expenses. (See Case 2025 at 192; Brief
of Appellant, 23-27.) Diviney maintains the amount is erroneously high. The restitution
order should be modified to reflect only costs relating to and incurred after the crimes in
this case. (Brief of Appellant, 27.)
To explain, in May 2000, Deborah incurred costs for securing her home at 1767
West Hazelhurst. She changed garage and door locks and codes, and she repaired a
sliding glass door. (See Brief of Appellant at 24-25; R. 292:10.) On June 9, 2000,
Deborah purchased and paid for installation of an alarm service. (See 292:17.) She also
signed a contract to have her home monitored for one year, with payments apparently to
be made in installments. (See R. 292:21-22, 17-18.) CVR compensated Deborah for the
security costs predating the crimes. (See R. 292:14-18 (CVR paid "$494" and "$82" for
security/monitoring costs incurred at Hazelhurst prior to the crimes in this case).)
In July 2000, the state charged Diviney with committing crimes on June 14, 2000,
at 2075 East Harvest Park Court (Case No. 001911430 ("Case 1430") at 2-4), and on
July 11, 2000, at 6662 South Royal Harvest Way. (Case 2025 at 2-4, 19-22.)
On June 28, Deborah installed a deadbolt for $189.30. (R. 292:15.) On July 12,
she installed an alarm system at her son's home on South Royal Harvest Way.
(R. 292:33-34.) Deborah testified that the alarm system for the South Royal Harvest
address was donated and installed for free. (R. 292:34.) She was required to pay only
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for a remote control, which was $237, and for monitoring services in the amount of
$124. (See R. 292:34,21-23.) CVR compensated Deborah for those expenses.
In total, CVR paid Deborah $1,044.37Tor security at Hazelhurst and South Royal
Harvest. (Brief of Appellant at 24; R. 292:7, 14.) The trial court in turn ordered Diviney
to reimburse CVR in the amount of $961. (Case 2025 at 192.) That amount is incorrect.
In determining restitution here, Diviney has looked to the evidence and calculated
costs incurred after the crimes at the relevant properties. Those costs total $361. (Brief
of Appellant at 23-27.) Diviney's calculation is appropriate, since costs predating or
unrelated to the crimes are not recoverable in restitution. See State v. Bicklev, 2002 UT
App 342, ^|12, 60 P.3d 582 (defendant cannot be required to pay restitution for amounts
predating crimes); State v. Mast 2001 UT App 402, ^|24, 40 P.3d 1143; see also State v.
Watson, 1999 UT App 273,1J5, 987 P.2d 1289.
In response to Diviney's argument on appeal, the state does not take issue with the
law. In fact, the state acknowledges that the prosecutor did not intend to include costs
predating the crimes, including "the cost of buying and installing the first alarm system in
Deborah's primary residence on Hazelhurst ($494.00) or the cost of the first service
payment ($82)" in the restitution amount. (State's Brief at 24.) The state also asserts that
the prosecutor and trial court intended to omit "from the final restitution calculation the
purchase and installation of the system prior to the June 14 incident as well as the first
maintenance payment"

(State's Brief at 24.) For restitution, the state identifies an
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adjustment for reimbursement to CVR for personal property costs in the amount of $576
($494 plus $82). (Id)
Diviney agrees in relevant part with the state's claims regarding adjustments in the
amounts for personal property. (But see infra, pp. 15-16, herein.) Yet, review of the
record here supports that the trial court did not make the proper adjustments. Indeed, the
trial court relied on a "Brief on Restitution Issues" filed by the prosecutor. (See Case
2025 at 192 (the trial court's order reflected amounts calculated by the prosecutor in the
"Brief on Restitution Issues").) The prosecutor's calculations for personal property
expenses as set forth in the "Brief on Restitution Issues" are erroneously high.
Specifically, where the record supports that CVR compensated Deborah in the
total amount of $1,044.37 for installation of the alarm systems, monitoring services, and
other security matters (R. 292:7, 14-17), the prosecutor identified the total amount in the
"Brief on Restitution Issues" as $1,447. (Case 2025 at 186.) The difference between
the actual amount ($1,044) and the erroneous amount in the prosecutor's Brief ($1,447)
is approximately $403. (See R. 292:7, 14 (admitting that CVR compensated Deborah in
the amount of $1,044.37 for personal property expenses).) The miscalculation compels
the determination that the restitution order here must be adjusted.
Next, as Diviney maintained in the opening brief, and as the state has
acknowledged (see State's Brief at 24 (recognizing that the prosecutor and trial court
intended to omit "from the final restitution calculation" the costs incurred prior to June
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14)), Diviney cannot be required to pay restitution for costs incurred by Deborah, which
predated the crimes in the case. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^[12.
According to the evidence, the costs incurred prior to June 14 related to the
Hazelhurst property; those costs totaled $576 ($494 plus $82). (R. 292:14-17; see State's
Brief at 24.) In the "Brief on Restitution Issues," the prosecutor again miscalculated the
amounts. He erroneously identified the "non-qualifying" fees as "$449 plus $82." (Case
2025 at 186.) By transposing the numbers ("$449M for "$494"), the prosecutor's
adjustment was erroneous. The difference between the actual deductions ($494 plus
$82) and the prosecutor's calculations ($449 plus $82) is $45. Thus, the restitution order
again must be adjusted.
In this case, the prosecutor began with an erroneously high number ($1,447 versus
$1,044) and reduced it by an erroneously low number ($531 versus $576) to calculate
restitution (Case 2025 at 186), while Diviney has simply looked to the evidence to
calculate the amounts. (Brief of Appellant at 23-27.) Diviney's calculations are correct.
There is still more to the analysis. As stated above, CVR's compensation to
Deborah totaled $1,044.37. (R. 292:7, 14.) According to the evidence, that amount
included $494 in non-qualifying fees for the alarm system and monitoring at Hazelhurst
(seeR. 292:14-17); $189.30 for a deadbolt (R. 292:15); $124 for monitoring services
from July to October at the South Royal Harvest address (R. 292:21, 34); and $237 for a
remote control and alarm system at South Royal Harvest Way. (R. 292:16, 20, 34.)
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Those amounts total $1,044.30. That is what CVR paid to Deborah. (R. 292:7, 14.)
While Ackmann testified that CVR also compensated Deborah in the additional
amount of $82 for costs predating the crimes (see R. 292:17), that amount does not seem
to factor into the total of $1,044. Stated another way, either Ackmann already reduced
the amount by $82 when she identified the total as $1,044.37; or the $82 is part of the
$494-contract price predating the crimes in this case. Thus, the trial court should not
have identified additional reductions in restitution in the amount of $82.
Consider the final breakdown, according to Ackmann and Deborah, as follows:

Total:

Amounts paid by CVR to Deborah

Dates costs were incurred

$494 (alarm/monitoring at
Hazelhurst, including
monitoring for June, Sept.)
$189.30 (deadbolt)

May 2000; June 9, 2000
(R. 292:15-17, 21-22)
June 28, 2000 (R. 292:15)

$124 (monitoring service for
July 12,2000 (R, 292:16,
July to Oct. at Royal Harvest)
21-23,34)
$237 (security remote control/
July 12,2000 (R. 292:22-23,34)
installation at Royal Harvest)
$1,044.37 (Total amount that CVR paid to Deborah (292:7,14)).
In the end, once the prosecutor's miscalculations are corrected (see supra, pages

11-14), the only amount in dispute here relates to installation of the deadbolt ($189).
That is, the state admits the calculation for personal property must be reduced by $494
(State's Brief at 24), and Diviney acknowledges restitution in the amount of $361 ($124
plus $237) for costs at South Royal Harvest Way after July 11, 2000. (Brief of Appellant
at 27; Case 2025 at 19-22 (alleging crimes on July 11 at South Royal Harvest Way).)
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However, Diviney maintains that the deadbolt costs are not recoverable in restitution. According to the record, those costs were incurred at the Hazelhurst address. (R.
292:10 (Deborah incurred costs for doors and locks at Hazelhurst).) The crimes in this
case did not occur at Hazelhurst (see Case 2025 at 19-22; Case 1430 at 2-4). Also,
security at Hazelhurst did not relate to this case. (See R. 292:32-33.) Further, Diviney
did not admit responsibility for crimes at that address. (R. 291.) Thus, the costs relating
to the deadbolt may not be included in the restitution order. (Brief of Appellant at 23-27);
see Mast, 2001 UTApp 402, Ifijl 1-15.
The state disagrees and claims the deadbolt may have been installed at the South
Royal Harvest address. (See State's Brief at 23, n.15.) Assuming arguendo that were
true, that expense would not be recoverable in restitution since the deadbolt costs predate
the crimes at South Royal Harvest Way. (See R. 291:8-12 (admitting to crimes at South
Royal Harvest Way on July 11); 292:15 (deadbolt costs incurred on June 28, predating
the crimes at South Royal Harvest Way)); Bicklev. 2002 UT App 342, f 12 (costs
predating crimes were not recoverable in restitution); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(c),
(4)(a)(i) (allowing restitution for special damages resulting from criminal activity).
Based on the evidence, this Court may arrive at the amount in restitution set forth
in the opening Brief of Appellant. Specifically, Diviney may be ordered to reimburse
CVR in the amount of $361 ($124 plus $237) for payments made to Deborah for security
at the South Royal Harvest address after July 11. (See Brief of Appellant at 27.)
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In sum, the trial court's restitution order for personal property appears to be based
on the prosecutor's miscalculations rather than actual amounts paid by CVR to Deborah.
(Compare R. 292:7, 14-17, 20-23 (Ackmann identified amounts paid to Deborah for
security costs), with Case 2025 at 186 (prosecutor identified an erroneous amount for the
same).) In addition, the deadbolt costs are not recoverable in restitution. As set forth in
the Brief of Appellant, Diviney requests that this Court vacate the amount in the court's
restitution order for personal property, and remand the matter for proper calculation.
2. The Restitution Issue Relating to Personal Property Was Properly Preserved.
The state seems to claim that Diviney failed to properly preserve the argument for
appeal relating to restitution costs for personal property. The state asserts, the "defendant
did not raise [the] argument below [regarding security at Hazelhurst] when he mentioned
installation of the burglar alarm' prior to the first offense (R. 293:3), and he made no
other specific objection to payment of the post-June 14 service fee for the alarm system".
(State's Brief at 22.) The state's argument lacks reasoned analysis and must be rejected.
See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)
(2003) (requiring adequate briefing); State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (rejecting state's arguments where they were inadequately briefed).
The state's argument also is misplaced. According to Utah law, the preservation
rule serves to ensure that the trial court is "given an opportunity to address a claimed error
and, if appropriate, correct it.'" State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, HI 1, 10 P.3d 346. Here,
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that purpose was served. At sentencing, the court ordered Diviney to pay restitution.
Diviney requested a hearing. (See R. 408:12-13 (at sentencing Diviney objected to
restitution and requested a hearing).) The hearing was for the trial court's benefit.
During the hearing, Ackmann testified that CVR compensated Deborah for costs
incurred for securing the Hazelhurst property prior to the crimes in this case. (R. 292:1418, 20-23.) Diviney then argued that amounts relating to the Hazelhurst property and
predating the crimes should not be included in the final restitution order. Diviney's counsel argued that the improper amounts included claims "for reimbursements prior to the
date of the offense of [June 14, 2000], that included the installation of the burglar alarm
and some of the payments thereunder." (R. 293:3.) Counsel also stated the following:
We believe that [Deborah] Diviney has simply seen an opportunity to - to pursue a
course of- of being compensated for something indeed that she was not entitled to
be compensated for. The Victim Reparations has - has, without question, paid
every - every request that she's made without - it hasn't - it hasn't done an investigation and now we're here at the point where they're saying, okay, restitution is is appropriate for this. The testimony does not indicate that, and we would ask the
Court to scrutinize the restitution with regards to how much is actually compensable, if any, and award accordingly. Not just sit back and say, well, they've
asked for this much money, therefore, I'm going to give it. It's inappropriate.
There's no basis for - for a substantial portion of that money, Your Honor.
(R. 293:6 (referring to claims for restitution identified in the prosecutor's "Brief on
Restitution Issues").)
The trial judge was apprised of the evidence and issues relating to restitution in
this case. (R. 292, 293.) The trial court ruled on each aspect of restitution, including
restitution in the amount of $916 for CVR "for payments made to [Deborah] Diviney for
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the expense of installing an alarm system and the expense of quarterly fees associated
with two alarm systems." (Case 2025 at 192.) The purpose of the preservation doctrine
was served here. See Hart, 945 P.2d at 129 ("A matter is sufficiently raised if it is
submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue").
The state's claim that the issue was not properly preserved is insupportable. This Court
may decide the issue on the merits.
CONCLUSION
The state has acknowledged a clerical error in the entry of the sentence and
judgment, and errors in the trial court's computation of restitution. (State's Brief at 12,
17.) Diviney respectfully requests that this Court remand this case for correction of those
matters. In addition, Diviney respectfully urges this Court to vacate the trial court's order
of restitution as it relates to compensation for "charge off1 days and days worked in July,
and as it relates to the miscalculations for amounts in restitution for personal property.
Those amounts are incorrect and must be adjusted.
Diviney is not incarcerated. Nevertheless, he requests that this Court resolve this
matter promptly. In order to accommodate such a request, Diviney hereby submits the
arguments on the briefs, pursuant to Rule 29(a)(3), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SUBMITTED this L* day of A J M ^ ^

2004.

LINDA M.JONES /]
SALT LAKE LEGAKDEFENDER ASSOC.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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